Rebalancing to consumption is grinding forward, but don't expect Chinese consumers to revive global growth.

China's rebalance to a consumer economy is grinding along.  At the heart of many of Beijing's recent reforms is the effort to roll-back decades of forcing households to subsidize rapid industry and infrastructure at the expense of consumption.  If overall growth does not collapse, China's consumers will keep growing. By the numbers, China's consumer boom has massive potential.  China's household consumption in 2014 made up 37.7% of its economy, a long way off from economic peers in Asia.  Consumption moving to a share of the economy closer to other Asia EM peers, such as Korea with around 50%, would require $1.3 trillion USD.  $1.3 trillion is just under the size of the entire economy of Spain.  The potential for growth is significant, as long as China's overall economic growth - especially the rapid job creation engine service sector - does not completely collapse and crush income growth.

McKinsey & Co is estimating that mainstream consumers, described as the standard setters for consumption, capable of affording cars and all manner of consumer goods, will rise to 167 million households by 2020, from just 14 million in 2010.  Affluent households are expected to rise to 20 million by 2020 from just 4.5 million in 2010.

Rebalancing to consumption is taking place in 2015

Within China's numbers we can observe the rebalancing.  Real GDP is probably growing around 6.5% this year.  Industrial production is running around 6.1% growth.  Retail sales outpaced these numbers, growing at 10.8% in August, 10.4% on a real basis.  Healthcare & pharma, furniture, appliances, and jewelry are growing in the double digits.  Online sales grew around 50% from last year.  And, retail numbers understate consumption because rapidly growing service consumption is not included.  Even with the economy slowing, firms like Nike and Starbucks are reporting stellar growth in China this year.  As industry slows, consumption is holding up well.

Chinese consumers won't boost global growth for some time

But, don't count on Chinese consumers to replace the hole in global demand left by declining demand from China's once rapidly growing industrial and construction sectors.  China's industry and construction sectors drive demand for commodities and industrial machinery, the economy's primary imports.  

China, being the main producer of the world's consumer goods, needs few imports from the rest of the world.  By my calculation, using 2013 data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China, only 2% of China's total imports are consumer goods.  Roughly 5% of all imports are edible agricultural products and foodstuffs.  Another 5% of imports are all vehicles to transport people; planes, trains, and autos.  The rest of China's imports are primarily meant for its massive industry and construction.  As you can see from the maps below, shipments of consumer goods to China are not as significant to the rest of the world in comparison to all of China's imports.

As consumption grows, perhaps its demand for consumables from around the world will grow. But, recent data shows that China's consumption is growing more domestic-oriented. According to a 2014 study by Bain & Co, covering 40,000 households, foreign brands are losing share across a broad category of products.  Overall, 60% of foreign brands lost market share across the consumer market.  

China manufactures a massive amount of the world's consumer goods, and productivity growth along with supply chain efficiency will keep manufacturing in China for some time even as wages grow higher than some peers in the region.  According to McKinsey, labor productivity in China rose 11% a year between 2007 and 2012, compared to 8% in Thailand and 7% in Indonesia.  And, automation in China is driving forward.  In 2013, China became the biggest market for industrial robots.  Rising wages will some day potentially make imported consumer goods more attractive, but that trend is years away.  It will be a while before China's consumers can meaningfully lift world growth and offset the effects of its declining industry juggernaut.

CONSUMER GOODS EXPORTS TO CHINA AS % OF EACH COUNTRYS' GDP                  
 
 
ALL EXPORTS TO CHINA AS A % OF GDP PER COUNTRY

China commodities: Falling demand in a sea of expanding global supply.

China's voracious appetite for raw materials from the rest of the world is in flux.  The economy’s inevitable slowdown to a more sustainable rate of growth has been one of the most widely anticipated global economic events in recent times; the quandary has been just how slow and how extreme the drop will be.  Gauging China’s demand for commodities will depend not only on figuring out how slow China's economy will eventually grow, but what sectors are slowing.  

There are three important things to note about China’s commodity demand.  First, industry and construction, the main sources of raw material usage, have declined much faster than the overall economy.  This trend will continue in 2016 as Beijing lowers its growth target again, keeping downward pressure on major commodity demand.  Second, price declines have exaggerated China’s commodity import drop.   Recently, most major commodities have seen weaker imports, but not the collapse suggested by headline numbers.  Import volumes have held up much better than in the last economic downturn (see the charts below).  And third, demand for various commodities will be highly divergent going forward, with coal demand for example, dropping for the foreseeable future, and agricultural imports rising.

China's slowdown is disproportionately hurting commodity demand, and supply growth globally has overwhelmed weaker demand.

For years Beijing has told us two things: They are going to restructure to quality growth (services and consumption playing a bigger role), and policymakers want to move growth to a lower sustainable trend rate.  The only way to achieve those two goals is by letting industry and fixed investment drop (which is what we have seen in recent years) while maintaining rapid growth in services and consumption.  Heavy industry has dropped like a bag of hammers, and services and consumption have remained strong.  That has made growth highly uneven on its way down to a lower more sustainable long-term rate.  A commodity exporter gets little benefit from a soft landing in overall GDP in such a bifurcated growth scenario.  Online retail sales are growing at almost 50% a year, while steel production is down almost 5% from last year.  Compounding the uneven slowdown effects, much of the world's commodity capacity was built for China's "miracle growth" of the 2000s.  Supply, especially from mainland China producers, will take some time to adjust to a weaker China.  For many commodity exporters in markets where supply has charged forward unabated, China's uneven slowdown has felt like a hard landing.

Expect weak demand for many commodities to continue into 2016 as Beijing will probably reduce the growth target another 0.50%.  

A reduced growth target will lead to reduced fiscal and monetary stimulus, which will disproportionately weigh on investment and heavy industry, the main sources of demand for raw materials.  We may see a short-term boost in demand from the property market rebound this year and late '15 fiscal spending, but demand may slow further in 2016 for most major commodities.

Demand has weakened for most commodities, but we are not witnessing a complete collapse of all commodity demand.  

In fact, as seen from the charts below, the volume of imports is weak, but not falling dramatically.  It is the combination of both weak demand and commodity producers increasing output that has lead to the massive price drops, and the dramatic drop in the value of China's imports.  Iron ore, copper, oil, and aluminum suppliers in particular have pushed greater output despite weaker demand in recent years.  The result has been a tidal wave of supply overwhelming demand and crushing prices.  China's suppliers in particular have kept production robust in the face of weaker demand.

Domestic suppliers are still pushing down prices.

China mining firms are not subject to the same profit maximizer behavior as more market-oriented firms globally.  Local mines will keep pumping out production regardless of the price as local leaders are incentivized to keep mines and smelters open in order to maintain stable employment.  China produces 47% of the world's aluminum and over 40% of its iron ore, and miners seem to be keeping the foot on the production “gas pedal" regardless of prices. Therefore, excess supply in local commodities - aluminum and iron ore in particular - may persist for some time, even as prices drop.  China only produces 9% of global copper output, meaning supply is primarily based outside of China and will come offline much quicker than other base metals as prices fall.  

Here are some details on selected commodities in China:

Coal

China accounts for 13% of global economic growth, but 47% of the world’s coal consumption.  almost 70% of China’s electricity production comes from coal burning, causing the deadliest pollution in the world.  A recent study by Berkeley Earth concluded that 1.6 million deaths in China each year can be attributed to air pollution.  Coal has powered China’s economic "miracle growth", and now is the source of much pain.

After the 2013 “airpocalypse” events in China, pollution became the main source of civil unrest.  Beijing countered by announcing the “war on pollution”.  Since then, coal demand has plummeted.  Coal mining investment to August 2015 is down 14% from last year.  Beijing is trying to rapidly reduce coal burning as it adds massive amounts of renewable energy capacity.

The bottom line is, coal demand will face the double whammy of slowing industry and the “war on pollution”.  Coal demand of all types will continue a rapid decline for the foreseeable future; bad news for Mongolian and Australian exporters.

Copper

Copper demand has remained very weak, which for many analysts seems to be a surprise given the potential state-directed boost expected this year.  China is working to upgrade its cross-country electricity transmission in order to send electricity instead of coal from resource rich regions to wealthy coastal cities beset with deadly air pollution.  Grid upgrades, renewable energy investments, and vast long distance ultra-high voltage power line investment was supposed to boost copper demand this year.  Grid investment alone was supposed to increase 24% in 2015, as announced early in the year.  As recent as September 1, officials announced new spending of $315 billion from 2015 to 2020 for grid infrastructure improvements.  

However, improved demand for copper has yet to materialize.  Recent estimates for 2015 demand by Antiake are for a 6% consumption growth in 2015, down from a 9% increase forecasted at the beginning of the year.  China copper imports by volume are down 8% so far this year vs. 2014. 

Most research firms have grown more negative on copper over the last few months as uncertainty over Beijing’s ability to keep the economy on track grows.  Goldman Sachs sees copper demand continuing to decline on property weakness, arguing that potential improvements in grid-related demand are overstated.  Societe Generale recently cut its forecast for 2015 global copper demand nearly in half, to 2.5%, primarily driven by uncertainty in China.  Supply on the other hand is expected to increase 3% for the year.

Demand improvement depends on whether or not you think China’s infrastructure and grid spending surge will ever materialize.  I expect it will, and imports will have to increase as inventories have dwindled.

Oil

There are two offsetting factors in China’s oil demand prospects.  First, demand from the real economy has weakened.  Car sales have slowed to around 2.5% so far this year from a 10 year average annual growth rate of 21%.  Freight traffic will moderate with the industry slowdown.  Pollution controls will force changes to automobile efficiency.  Crude oil imports on a volume basis have grown 10.5% on average for the last ten years.  But going forward, the demand from the real economy will certainly be weaker than the last ten years.  As of August, the IEA’s latest forecast for Chinese demand growth is 3.2% for 2015.  China imports almost two-thirds of its oil consumed, and production is up only 3% this year.  So, import growth from underlying demand will be weaker than in the past, running at a third of the trend growth rate potentially.

On the other hand, China is building massive strategic petroleum reserves, and is not finished yet.  According to the International Energy Agency China has accumulated about 200 million barrels of crude in its reserve so far and aims to have 500 million by 2020.  300 million barrels represents about 13% of China’s total 2014 crude imports.  When and if all this storage is added is in the hands of policymakers.

The end result of these two opposing factors is a robust 10% growth in imports for the year so far.  But going forward, the problem with oil demand is similar to other commodities; structural underlying demand growth is certainly growing weaker relative to previous years, but the prospects for a boost in demand are in the hands of policymakers building reserves, and therefore remains an uncertainty.

Agriculture

Argicultural commodity demand in China is widely expected to fare much better than metals and energy.  Rising incomes, changing preferences, a structural rebalance to consumption, and recent price declines have pushed commodity imports higher this year.  By volume, some commodity shipments have surged dramatically (see chart below).

The USDA expects continued growth for years to come, with soybeans dominating imports.  The US supplies half of China’s soybean and cotton imports, so the trend is a positive for US exporters.

Year to Date Imports % Change from Last Year to Aug '15

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China

Iron Ore

With the expectation of another target growth reduction next year, infrastructure growth is likely to continue its deceleration.  Iron ore demand will suffer from lower infrastructure investment than most other commodities.  About a third of iron ore goes to infrastructure building, with another third to property, and the last third to “other”.  Beijing’s infrastructure investment in the pipeline this year will probably add to demand a bit, but with the lower growth target comes less infrastructure spending.  So, on the demand side, the property market rebound will improve demand, but a lower growth target in 2016 will potentially negate the property market rebound.  Demand will weaken further, but not collapse.

On the supply side, many expect China ore producers to drop out when prices fall below $45/t, but iron ore production is a political issue.  Local policy bias to keep folks employed often outweighs profitability.  Supporting mines could get quite costly eventually.  China’s mines are high cost, with estimated break-even prices as high as $80.  That compares to BHP at $28/t, Rio around $30/t, Vale at $39, and Fortescue roughly $42/t.  If China were to support all of its iron ore producers down to $50/t, it would cost the government potentially 0.40% of GDP at a time when more pressing fiscal needs are abundant.

Credit Suisse expects iron ore prices to stay flat for the rest of the year, declining to $50/t in early 2016.

China's Onshore Bond Market Continues to Evolve

China's volatile stock market has regularly captured the headlines over the last year.  But, China's other major market, the bond market, is quietly undergoing meaningful changes.  China's onshore bond market is evolving rapidly, and opening up to global investors.

Mainland China has the world's third largest local bond market at roughly 4.2 trillion USD as of June 2014 according to the BIS, after the US (roughly 36 trillion USD) and Japan (almost 13 trillion).  China's local bond market is roughly double the size of Brazil's, the second largest EM market.  In relative size terms, the bond market is roughly 50% of GDP (see chart on the right), compared with the most current stock market capitalization of 75% of GDP.  

The pace of China's bond market growth has picked up in recent years.  Total outstanding local currency bonds are up 12% from last year, and trading volume in the corporate bond market rose 15% in Q2 this year compared to last.  As of July 2015, total oustanding non-financial bonds grew almost 19% from July of last year.  

Onshore corporate bond issuance has accelerated over the years from near nonexistence a decade ago (see chart on the right).  Firms have been incentivized to diversify funding sources and migrate to the lower funding costs of the bond market over bank loans.  Beijing has also been incentivized to grow the corporate bond market in an attempt to diversify risk away from commercial banks and onto the books of a much broader base of financiers.  It is important to note however that as of the end of 2014, state owned firms accounted for 90% of outstanding corporate bonds, and 70% of corporate issuers, according to Fitch.  The onshore corporate bond market is still more quasi-sovereign market than a pure corporate one.  And, banks still own the lion's share of the bond market.  As the bond market matures, defaults take place, and foreign investors have greater participation, look to the issuer base to diversify away from state affiliated firms and the investor base to diversify away from banks.

Ownership in the bond market

Banks are the primary owners of bonds in China's market, with individual investors, more interested in stocks and property, holding only a small share of the total.  Households allocate nearly all investable capital to bank deposits, property, and more recently stock holdings to a lesser extent.

According to the Asian Dev Bank, commercial banks own 74% of the government bond market (including central gov, local gov, central bank, and policy bank bonds). The next closest are investment funds with 6% of the total, and insurance firms with about 5%.  Banks account for roughly 70% of all bond trading volume.

Foreign participation

Unless you are a central bank or sovereign wealth fund, accessing China's onshore bond market is difficult now, but opening up more and more each month.  Foreign investors can participate in the Chinese bond market via two programs used by Beijing to open the capital account in a slow, controlled manner.  The first, launched in 2003, is the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) program.  This program allows licensed foreign investors to buy and sell both local bonds and stocks.  As of June 2015 the total quota for the QFII program was $75 billion USD, roughly 0.80% of the market, for 285 approved foreign investors.  The quota has expanded quickly in recent years as China works to open the current account as part of broader financial reforms.

The second program is the RMB Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (RQFII) program.  Started in 2011, the RQFII allows investors to access the China bond and stock market via yuan denominated accounts held overseas.  As of recently, 11 countries participate in the program.  As of June 2015, the maximum quota for the RQFII program was 383 billion RMB.

See my inforgaphic for more details on foreign investment programs:

 

Five years ago Beijing also started allowing central banks and overseas lenders that conduct trade settlement in yuan access to the local bond market.  According to Standard Charterd Bank, over 50 central banks hold some yuan denominated bonds, although many of these are offshore yuan denominated securities - "dim sum" bonds.

These programs continue to open the country up to foreign participation, which will ultimately lead to Beijing's reform goal of a fully convertible currency sometime in the future.  As of March 2015, offshore institutions held roughly $93 billion worth of local currency bonds, up 44% from the prior year.  That number is roughly 1.60% of China's total bond market.

Most foreign investors access China's market via offshore bonds, most of which are denominated in US dollars.  The offshore market is dominated by large state-owned issuers, with higher yielding property developer issuance growing rapidly.  Offshore bonds come with a higher yield, roughly .50% to 0.80% for medium-term state owned enterprises.  Offshore bonds also have a the added advantage of minimal direct currency exposure.  Currency hedging the onshore bonds as of the writing of this article will cost around 5 - 6%, fairly expensive.  According to Morningstar, the offshore bond market is $349 billion, with risky property developers about 12% of the total.  Beijing recently reduced barriers to offshore debt issuance, and rapid growth will continue.  China will continue to quickly grow as a large constituent in a number of bond indices, like the JP Morgan EMBI.

The bond market and China's reserve currency prospects

The comparable sizes of the world's top three bond markets have an impact on the pace at which China's yuan can replace the USD as the world's most dominant reserve currency.  It will be some time before the yuan can replace the dollar's dominance as the world's number one reserve currency.  As you can see from the market size comparisons at the top, China's treasury bond market is not yet deep enough to accommodate the lion's share of the $11 trillion global reserves held by central banks around the world.  The market will need to grow significantly to accommodate Beijing's reserve currency aspirations.

China's acceptance as a reserve currency by central bankers could eventually result in trillions of inflows into its markets, and in turn keep interest rates relatively low for some time.  According to Deutsche Bank, three trillion yuan could flow into China's bond market over the next 3 - 5 years as China opens the market and central banks buy China's bonds for reserve purposes. 

Types of bonds in China's bond market:

  • Central government bonds are issued by the Ministry of Finance, and constitute one of the largest pieces of the bond market.  Bonds issued by local governments are only a small, but rapidly growing, portion of government bond issuance.  In 1994 local governments were restricted from issuing their own debt.  But in recent years, in order to roll-back the opaque and difficult to control local government debts, Beijing is trying to grow the local government bond market.  This year local governments will be allowed to convert 3.2 trillion RMB of opaque debt for transparent municipal bonds.  Central government bonds account for roughly 27% of China's bond market.  Local government bonds only account for about 3% of the market.
  • Non-financial corporate bonds issued by state affiliated and private firms come in various tenors, from commercial paper to longer-term notes.  The most common and liquid are medium-term-notes with tenors of three to five years.  Longer tenors are traded less frequent and are harder to exit. The largest category of non-financial corporate bonds are "enterprise" bonds, issued by large state affiliated and state owned firms.  Corporate notes, enterprise bonds, and commercial paper account for around a quarter of all bonds.  A list of the top corporate bond issuers is on the left.
  • Central bank notes and short-term instruments are issued by the PBOC for the implementation of monetary policy.  
  • Financial bonds are issued by policy banks and commercial banks.  Policy banks are China's largest bond issuers.  These banks include China Development Bank (CDB), China EximBank, and Agricultural Development Bank.  Their primary purpose is to lend money based upon furthering political and economic policy agendas.  Bonds issued are backed by the central government and the PBOC.  The largest policy lender, CDB, is primarily responsible for funding infrastructure projects, such as the Three Gorges dam and the Shanghai Pudong airport. Policy banks account for roughly 27% of the bond market.

Going forward

Beijing will continue to rapidly grow the bond market as it tries to diversify financial markets away from bank loans and create a less opaque debt load.  Getting foreign money into the bond market is also a key goal.  While approvals for more outgoing investment have been stagnate for the last 4 months, inflow approvals have been on the rise.  The continued opening of onshore markets to foreigners will have the combined effect of growing the bond market, opening the capital account per reform plans, expediting Beijing's goal of making the RMB a major reserve currency, and offsetting capital outflows.  The last item is the more pressing issue recently given the surge in outflows from sinking investor confidence and a PBOC effectively printing money while the Fed is planning to move in the opposite direction.

 

 

Should We Believe China's GDP Data?

China's GDP data reliability has been in question for years.  Over the last couple of decades questions regularly arise on whether or not to believe official growth numbers out of Beijing.  Recently the subject has gained traction in the news as stock market volatility elevated worries of China's economic prospects.  

Even in the official data there is evidence that underlying growth is below the stated 7% numbers for Q1 & Q2. As I have mentioned in a previous blog, the froth from a financial market surge pushed China's growth numbers to 7% so far this year.  Underling growth readings from the official data point to a GDP growth more likely around 6.5% so far this year.  See my posting 7% GDP growth? Probably not. for more details.

Certainly if you look at other EM country GDP numbers over time, China's data looks suspiciously smooth.  But while Beijing can be accused of smoothing the data, or suffering the same difficulties that other EM countries have measuring the entire economy during a rapid transition, recent charges that China's numbers are completely fabricated to hide a hard landing are less credible.  Smoothing, calculation problems, distortions from some local leaders fluffing the data, and the occasional transient froth from specific sectors means the GDP number are far from total reliability, but they can still be in the right ballpark. 

Few studies have been done on the reliability of China's GDP data.  The most important that I know of was conducted by the Fed Reserve Bank of SF in an economic letter from March 25th 2013.  After using alternative data from inside and outside of China they concluded that the GDP numbers were not unreliable stating that "These alternative domestic and foreign sources provide no evidence that China’s economic growth was slower than official data indicate.", and that  "...these models suggest that Chinese growth has been in the ballpark of what official data have reported."  The conclusion ruled out policymaker complete fabrication.

But in the end, the reality is that China's overall GDP number is of little use to most folks anyway, and a more nuanced analysis than in the past is required to know what is going on in individual sectors and the economy as a whole.   

Alternative numbers

Much was made of future Premier Li Keqiang's WikiLeaks memo stating his distrust of official GDP numbers back in 2007 when he was running the Liaoning province.  He instead favored using rail freight data, electricity output, and bank loans to gauge the economy.  Certainly in his province of Liaoning, a significant supplier of ore and heavy industry, a decade ago those three numbers were good indicators.  But in today's China where services account for over 49% of economic output and industry around 42%, those three numbers are completely unrepresentative of the broad economy (see my posting The "Li Keqiang" Index: Why is that still a thing?).  The 2010 leaked Li Keqiang memo spawned some of the first alternative GDP calculations.  A version of the "Li Keqiang" index is on the chart to the right.

There have been a wide variety of alternative GDP measures released over recent years. Some have very explicit ingredients, like the "Li Keqiang" index, which uses freight, electricity output, and bank loan data.  But most alternative measures from research firms are black boxes, which is a concern.  China's economic data is rooted in its communist planning past, with its main statistics bureau highly reliant on reporting numbers for heavy industries and the physical output of tangible things.  As a result, most of China's economic data has to do with industry, with very little data available for crunching service sector statistics.  My worry is that most alternative measures use the easy-to-get industrial data, therefore missing roughly half of economic output or more in the calculations.

Official data is 7%, around 6.5% if you strip out the froth from the financial sector early in the year.  Bloomberg news service has its own alternative measure for growth, and its GDP tracker is running 6.6% as of July 2015.  Capital Economics has the number running somewhere around 5%.  Lombard Street Research pegged growth at 3.8% in Q2, indicating a hard landing.  There are a number of alternative GDP measures out there to choose from, which means nowadays both soft landing and hard landing forecasters seem to have evidence on their side.

For my own monthly GDP measure, I calculate the numbers for industry and service GDP sectors independently using a wide variety of economic data and principal components analysis.  Then, I combine the measures based on respective weightings in overall GDP.  My indicators point to July growth running at 6.5% overall, with 5.6% from the industrial sector, and 7.8% from services.

Unreliable GDP numbers do not equate to hard landing

One implication of the rise of skepticism in China's numbers is that hard landing doomsayers and collapsists can now say that they have been proven right.  Pundits, like Gordon Chang who has been warning for 15 years that a China collapse is imminent, are using data skepticism to bail out their own bad predictions.  With GDP skepticism on their side, hard landing doomsayers and collapsists have now begun to dominate much of the China conversation. 

There are plenty of indications that do not support the dramatic hard landing GDP numbers indicated by the more pessimistic alternative measures like Lombard's.  Number crunching some data from outside of China, such as trade data from Australia and Brazil, does not confirm the dramatic declines by the more pessimistic alternative GDP measures (see my chart on the right, a generic unscaled combination of various data).  In fact, on a volume basis, shipments from key exporting countries do not confirm a hard lading scenario.  Ausrtalian iron ore shipments on a volume basis, Japan and Korea exports to China, and Brazilian shipments, all point to weaker demand for sure, but not a dramatic collapse of growth.  The private Caixin manufacturing PMI is running at 47.3, indicating contraction in manufacturing, but far from the PMI numbers in the 30s in 2008 that would indicate China is in economic crisis territory.  In the past, the general rule was 8% growth was the threshold for supporting employment, and anything below that would lead to unrest and massive unemployment.  If China is growing well below half of the threshold widely accepted only 4-5 years ago we would expect to see problems from massive joblessness.  Pollution is still the number one cause of social unrest, and massive unemployment has not been seen.  Growth is certainly slowing, probably more than official numbers indicate.  But, many other information sources do not confirm the hard landing indicated by some alternative GDP measure providers.

Stop looking at overall GDP for indications of economic activity

The overall GDP number might give us an indication of whether Beijing needs more or less stimulus, and frequently has an effect on risk assets around the world.  But, because of restructuring and a highly uneven slowdown, China's 7% growth number is less relevant than it once was.  For years Beijing has told us two things: They are going to restructure to quality growth (services and consumption playing a bigger role), and policymakers want to move growth to a lower sustainable trend rate.  The only way to achieve those two goals is by letting industry and fixed investment drop, which is what we have seen, while maintaining rapid growth in services and consumption.  Heavy industry has dropped like a bag of hammers, and services and consumption have remained strong, making economic growth highly uneven.   A commodity exporter gets little use from the overall GDP in such a bifurcated growth scenario, as does an online retailer for example.  Online retail sales are growing at almost 50%, all the while steel production is down almost 5% from last year.

In short, Beijing is probably guilty of smoothing data, and/or releasing flawed data as it struggles with the difficulties of measuring a rapidly changing vast economy.  There is a small possibility that data is fabricated, as China's leadership will go to great lengths to maintain control over their perceived governing ability. But, a nefarious attempt to completely misrepresent economic growth in order to mask a hard landing is less probable as other information sources do not confirm that finding.  If we accept the San Francisco Fed's 2013 analysis, even if we assume China's GDP numbers are flawed and not completely reliable, they are at least in the right ballpark.  

But, GDP is not a useful number for China research anyway.  A more nuanced and complex analysis is required to measure what is happening in the Chinese economy going forward.

中国房地产的市场反弹:两类城市,两样景气

中国房地产市场的反弹趋势是非常错综复杂的。沿海较发达地区,以及一级与二级城市都处于反弹的房地产市场之中。在内地及二三线城市的区域、则仍处于负面走向。在很大程度上,这是因为在不同的地区被压抑的库存数量有别之故。 

在中国的内陆地区,已看到了农村的住宅过剩、以及所谓的“鬼城”建筑,源于地方领导和开发商对繁荣景气的预期过度而发动了大规模的项目所致。许多内地的经济已随着繁荣时期的结束而萧条了下来——尤其是采矿区——欠发达的城市与省份,已留下了满坑满谷未使用的物业产权。根据今年(见右图)最新一期的国际货币基金组织第四条款报告,中国的住宅楼盘过剩、主要是出在中下层及农村欠发达地区过度兴建的问题。较为发达的城市和地区的楼盘库存量——那些对经济增长贡献最大者——则较为吃紧。

这种分岔式的房地产市场反弹、推进了两个潜在的影响:首先,在靠海岸与顶级一线城市的大省经济体所面临的供应紧张与价格上涨(见右上图表)将是个短期增长的增压。一种建筑与物业在大型增长的驱动下所生之反弹(见右下省区图)、将会导致在短期间对整体经济活动作出正面的贡献。

其次,在内陆地区,房地产开发一直是经济活动的主要驱动力与收入增长的来源。然而在中小城市与欠发达的地区已经受到了冲击,来自采矿与工业活动的放缓。如果重化工业、矿业、投资,乃至最后连房地产市场也正在萎缩时,那么内地与低线城市的经济转型前景又在哪里?以大量重工业与采矿活动为经济来源的欠发达地区,例如山西、黑龙江等北方省辖区域(国内生产总值的同比分别增长为2.7%和5.1%),已看到了今年经济增长的疲乏。较发达地区,如天津、重庆则仍然出现较快的增长。

居民收入增长的速度有别——部分资金是来自快速的房地产开发——即有助于在富裕地区的服务业和消费的发展。那么,那些欠发达的中国地区,是否也在如此经济结构的调整下具备相同的生产能力?如果开发商和内陆地区的政府不愿或无力资助更多过度兴建的住房,那么房地产——一个重要的增长引擎——将会萧条下来。

在较发达城市的房地产价格正显着反弹

  70个城市每月住宅价格的变化百分比                  
 

 

过度构建的、未使用的物业在中国已成为一个有据可查的问题。而且问题很难衡量,因为中国的住房数字并未透明化。全国的住房,每5套潜在着有1套是闲置的。

如何解决上述问题,也是很难预测的。中国的户籍改革与快速城市化终将填补这样的需求。北京希望单独在2020年将一亿人口的中国农村城市化,这将等同于处理至少24个波士顿或37个芝加哥大小的区域。楼房库存过剩与“鬼城”现象,已透过开发大型项目所占的位置而恶化。在不发达和低层区域,大规模的住宅小区已在没有足够的基础设施或行业来支持它们的情况下相继被建造出来。也许,推动城市化的基础设施,有一天将有助于填补上述问题。但就目前而言,过度的建设开发已将下层区域摒弃于房市反弹之外,而且将肯定对收入的增长及改制的前景造成影响。

省区国内生产总值          

在比较发达的地区,短期的、更紧张的库存与价格上涨——经济增长的最大引擎—— 应有助于小幅提振广泛的活动。但是,大量的库存和价格的不断下降,在内陆地区则将导致收入增长、因而转型成为消费与服务的后果。内陆地区若想要跟随富裕的同行进入服务与消费的再平衡状态、则有可能会更缓慢一些。

China's housing market rebound: A tale of two (types of) cities

China's housing market rebound is highly mixed. The more developed coastal regions and tier 1 & 2 cities are in the midst of a rebounding property market.  Regions in the hinterlands and the lower tier cities are still in the negative.  Much of this has to do with the amount of pent-up inventory across the different regions.  

China's hinterlands have seen the bulk of the country's housing overcapacity and "ghost town" construction as local leaders and developers unleashed massive projects in anticipation of never-ending boom times.  As boom times have ended for many hinterland economies - mining regions in particular - less developed cities and provinces have been left with a mountain of unused housing property.  According to the most recent IMF Article IV report this year (see the chart to the right), China's residential real estate inventory surplus is primarily a problem of overbuilding in the lower tier and less developed regions of the country.  Inventory in the more developed cities and regions - those with the largest contribution to growth - is much tighter.

The bifurcated housing market rebound has two potential implications going forward: First, the tight supply and price increases in the big provincial economies on the coast and top tier cities (see the chart on the top right) will be a boost to short-term growth. A construction and real estate rebound in those large drivers of growth (see provincial map below right) will result in a positive contribution to overall economic activity in the short-term.

Second, property development has been a major driver of economic activity and income growth in the hinterlands.  The lower tier cities and less developed regions have already taken a hit from the slowing of mining and industrial activity. If heavy industry, mining, investment, and lastly the real estate market are faltering, what are the prospects for hinterland and low tier city economic restructuring?  Less developed regions with plenty of heavy industry and mining activity, Shanxi and Heilongjiang in the North for example (2.7% and 5.1% GDP growth on the year respectively), have seen faltering growth this year.  More developed regions like Tianjin and Chongqing are still experiencing relatively rapid growth.

Without the same rapid income growth - partly funded by rapid real estate development - that helped service and consumption develop in the wealthy regions, will less developed China have the same capacity for economic restructuring?  If developers and governments in the hinterlands are unwilling and unable to fund more housing overbuilding, then real estate - an important growth engine - will be flat.

Property prices in the more developed cities are rebounding dramatically

  MONTHLY % HOUSE PRICE CHANGES 70 CITIES                  
 
PROVINCE TOTAL GDP          

Overbuilding of unused property is a well-documented problem in China.  The problem is difficult to measure due to China's opaque housing figures.  Potentially countrywide 1 out of 5 housing units remains empty.  

How the problem will be resolved is difficult to forecast as well.  China's household registration reform and rapid urbanization will eventually fill the demand.  Beijing wants to urbanize 100 million rural Chinese by 2020 alone.  That will require the equivalent of at least 24 Bostons or 37 Chicagos.  The inventory surplus and "ghost town" phenomenon has been exacerbated by the location of development megaprojects.  Massive residential districts have been built in the undeveloped and low tier regions, without enough infrastructure or industries to support them.  Perhaps the urbanization infrastructure push will help fill them some day. But for now, the overbuilding has left the lower tier regions out of the housing market rebound and will certainly have implications for income growth and restructuring prospects.

For the short-term, the tighter inventory and price increases in the more developed regions - the largest engines of growth - should help modestly boost broad activity.  But the massive inventory and declining prices in the hinterlands will have consequences for income growth and therefore restructuring to consumption and services.  The hinterlands may be much slower following their wealthy counterparts into service and consumption rebalancing.

上海楼市 
楼市拐点 
中国楼市 
杭州楼市 
北京楼市 
楼市价格 

 

 

3 reasons why China could lower the 2016 growth target to 6.5% and what it means going forward

Fall is on its way, and with it comes preparations for China's Party Congress.  Leaders in Beijing will begin making and setting plans for economic goals and targets for 2016, which they will announce next Spring.  With the planning comes leaks, forecasts, and speculation by China watchers around the world.  This Fall's big worry will be the potential for another target growth drop to 6.5% from 7% this year.  2016 targets will not be announced until next Spring, but as enough consensus builds in the market for a growth target drop, risk assets and commodities will see more upheaval.  

Here are 3 reasons why a China target growth rate cut to 6.5% is highly probable:

1. Maintaining a higher rate of growth than necessary to maintain stability gets more costly each year.

Reflation per increased unit of GDP growth is growing more costly over time, both in terms of actual costs (budget deficit, bank costs from NPLs) and indirect costs (higher debt burden from monetary stimulus, financial repression from a weaker currency and lower deposit rates).  The fact that Beijing has done the bare minimum stimulus needed this year to stoke growth towards the 2015 target shows that policymakers are very aware of the costs and declining benefits of stimulus.

Each easing cycle meant to push growth to a politically mandated growth target brings a surge in the debt burden, NPLs, overcapacity, and pollution.  When China's non-sovereign debt-to-GDP was around 100% or so, easing was not a problem.  Now, with debt still growing faster than GDP, each increase in credit to spur growth pushes debt deeper into the 200% plus territory.  The incremental improvements in overall growth may not be worth the increased debt burden and the risks that burden creates.  In addition to the overall debt burden, NLPs are rising - up 11% in the second quarter - increasing with each round of easy credit.  

Fiscal stimulus is usually directed to sectors that boost polluting and overcapacity - heavy industries like steelmaking and construction materials for example.  Public money flowing to those industries adds to China's existing problems and pushes against structural reforms and pollution fighting measures.

A cut to 6.5% will reduce costs involved with fiscal and monetary measures, and will allow policymakers to save some dry powder for future potential economic risks.

2. A lower growth rate will help with the "war on pollution".

After years of China's rapid growth at the expense of air and water quality, by 2013 a series of events commonly referred to as "airpocolpyse" moved pollution to the top of the list of reasons for protests, beating out land expropriations.  Political degradation and the unrest it caused led to 2014's "war on pollution".  But, this year a Berkely Earth study estimated air pollution accounts for 1.6 million deaths a year.  On top of that, a recent NASA study named the Northern China Plain, one of China's most densely populated and economically important regions which includes Beijing, as one of the world's fastest deteriorating aquifers.  China's air is poisonous, its water polluted and scarce, and the result is 30,000 to 50,000 "mass incidents" of protest every year.  

Lowering the growth rate to 6.5% will help with the pollution fight and therefore take some pressure off of social dissent.  More dissent has been caused by pollution than growth already slowing below 7% this year.

3. Service sector employment growth is keeping employment stable at lower overall growth rates.

If you strip out the transient surge in financial services from stock market activity, China has been growing at about 6.5% so far this year already, and we have not seen the widespread employment problems that Beijing's leaders worry over.  One possible explanation is the continuing fast growth of service sector employment as services grow well above 8%.  

For China's policymakers, employment stability is of paramount importance.  The legitimacy of the country's political system depends on the Party's ability to maintain stability and prosperity.  Massive and sudden joblessness would put that legitimacy in jeopardy.  The underdeveloped service sector has been a source of fast employment growth for years.  The net workforce increase in the service sector for the five years to 2013 (the latest data) averaged 9 million jobs a year. That compares to 5 million jobs a year in industry, and a decline of 11 million jobs a year in agriculture.  The recent renewed shift of investment into services will keep that trend on track (see the chart to the right).

This year has illustrated that China's growth can run below 7% without triggering the widespread employment instability that frightens Beijing's policymakers.  As long as services and consumption rapidly grow from an underdeveloped state, growth around 6.5% can be tolerated.

What will another growth target rate cut mean for China's economy?

China doesn't need a hard landing for industrial machinery and commodity exporters to suffer.  It only needs a significant slowdown in industry after years of double digit growth, which is what we have seen so far in 2015.  

China's policy directed slowdown is highly uneven.  Services and consumption continue to grow at a fast clip.  Industry and construction have decelerated sharply.  The reason for this is the dual task of slowing trend growth to facilitate a soft landing while at the same time rebalancing the economy to grow the underdeveloped the consumption and service sectors.  China's service sector accounts for 48-49% of GDP.  EM peers, including Korea, Brazil, and Turkey all have service sectors above 60% of GDP.  Faster services and slower industry will help make headway on the "war on pollution" as well as slowly remove overcapacity in a number of heavy industries.

China Import Categories as an % of Total

Going forward this trend will continue.  A lower target rate of 6.5% GDP growth will result in a disporoprtunate deceleration in industry as services only modestly slow.  China is the workshop for the world's consumer goods, and faster consumption has few beneficiaries outside of China (see pie chart).  Services also have few beneficiaries outside of China.  But, commodity and industrial machinery exporters will feel more pain as the industrial sector moves from just below 6% this year to around 5% next year.  

The map below illustrates countries reliant on China demand that will be subject to further slowing in China's industrial sector.

EXPORTS TO CHINA AS A PERCENT OF GDP

经济硬着陆     
中国硬着陆     
软着陆 

Quick Data Update: Trade data negative again in August

China trade data saw another negative month in August.  Both imports and exports declined from the same time last year.  Certainly weak demand from both China and the rest of the world contributed to the declines, but China's strong currency and commodity supply growth leading to price declines were also significant contributors.

Imports declined from August of last month by roughly 14%.  But, much of this decline can be attributed to commodity price drops over the last year as producers - particularly crude oil and iron ore - have not let up on supply growth.  The S&P World Commodity Index has dropped around 50% over the last year, leading to a dramatic decline in the value of China's commodity imports, the largest import category.  Many key commodities have seen an increase in the volume of shipments to China (see the chart on the right).  This can be confirmed by the latest Australian trade numbers, showing the volume of iron ore and coal shipped to China has increased over the summer.  As of June, Australia iron ore shipments to China were up 12% by volume.  Accounting for dramatic commodity price moves, China import volumes were roughly flat on the year.

CNY 1 Year % Change vs. Major Trading Partners

Export numbers declined just over 5% from last year.  Exports have been weak all year, and will continue to be weak as the Chinese yuan has appreciated meaningfully vs. all other trading partners, with the exception of the US (see chart on the right).  China's strong currency vs. major trading partners will continue to be a drag on the export numbers for some time.

China exports were strong in a few countries on the Asian supply chain.  Imports have seen declines from both commodity and machinery exporting countries.  This trend will continue as Beijing lowers the target growth rate in 2016 (see my posting 3 reasons why China could lower the 2016 growth target to 6.5% and what it means going forward), commodity producers continue to increase output, and the CNY remains strong vs. trade partners on a 1 year basis.



Recent Study: 1.6 million deaths each year across China can be attributed to air pollution.

A recent report on China air quality from Berkeley Earth is a reminder of the human and economic toll of China's unbridled environmental degradation.  Air pollution is costly to fix, causes hundreds of billions of dollars a year in health care costs, reduces agricultural productivity, and dramatically reduces quality of life across China.  In Beijing alone, breathing the air is equivalent to smoking 40 cigarettes a day.  As many as 1.6 million deaths each year across China can be attributed to air pollution.  In the North, the epicenter of China's environmental degradation, 500 million people have seen 5.5 years shaved off of their lives due to coal burning.

For decades China's rapid growth has been akin to a marathon runner that hasn't stopped at any water stations, running at a fast but physically unsustainable pace.  The very tangible problems of pollution and the high costs associated with environmental degradation finally caught up over the last few years.

China's runaway pollution from rapid growth came to a head in 2013.  That year a number of incidents known as "airpocolypse" pushed the environment to the top of the list of reasons for public dissent, beating out land expropriation as the number one cause of protests. In 2014 Li Keqiang announced China's "war on pollution".  That war will be costly, but has lead to the most ambitious green energy effort in history. The government has outlined plans to spend $275 billion on efforts to reduce air pollution between 2013 and 2017.

China's response to pollution will cost hundreds of billions, if not eventually trillions of dollars to fix over time.  China's war on pollution is driving the country to ambitious investments in renewable energy.  According to the EIA China invested $89 billion in renewables in 2014, a 31% rise from 2013.  The US spent $52 billion by comparison that year.  The breakneck renewable investment growth will continue over the next 5 years to reach emission and renewable energy usage goals.  

Beijing policymakers have also turned their attention to environmental law enforcement.  This year China has set up more than 130 local environmental courts.  Recently the Supreme Court established an Environmental and Resources Tribunal and has appointed a senior judge to handle cases in an effort to improve law enforcement and guide lower courts.  Enforcement will see pushback from entrenched interests and probably see less success in curtailing pollution than results from renewable spending outlays.

China Total Primary Energy Consumption by Fuel Type 2012

By far, China's main air pollution culprit is its heavy reliance on coal.  Coal supplies almost 70% of China's energy needs.  China burns more coal than the rest of the world combined, with 22% of the world's population.  China built its heavy industries on the back of cheap coal, and now coal reliance has become one of the country's biggest burdens.  Much of the coal burning and metal smelting activity takes place in the North, surrounding Beijing.  As with water pollution, the epicenter of China's pollution is in and around the North China Plain, home to some of the country's most densely populated and economically strong areas such as Beijing and the Shangdong province.

Last year was the first time this century that coal output fell, with output declining 2.1% for the year.  China National Coal Association expects another decline of 2.5% this year as well.  Coal imports (by volume) also declined over 20% over the last year.  Beijing's goal is to reduce coal usage to 62% of total energy consumption by 2020.  The decrease from 66% to 62% is a difficult undertaking, but still suggests rampant coal burning will persist for some time, and so will its effects on air quality.  

The development of China's auto industry has also resulted in air quality reduction.  Auto emissions account for about 25 percent of the pollution problem by many estimates. Chinese now own more than 120 million passenger cars and another 120 million other vehicle types.

I lived in China a decade ago, in the Anhui province, and recall months going by without seeing blue sky or the sun.  Even the days with blue sky were very grey.  I frequently travelled to a city called Tongling on business, a city known for its copper smelting. On a monthly basis I suffered from coughs and sinus problems that lingered.  When I went for my morning jog my lungs burned after a while.  One of my most memorable arguments I had in China was with a friend who was certain that the blue sky in a number of scenes in the movie Elizabethtown, which takes place in the US, must have been created by special effects and could not be real. 

Facts and details about China's air pollution problem:

  • A study by Berkeley Earth monitoring 1,500 measurement stations over four months concluded that 17% of Chinese deaths each year can be attributed to air pollution.  That is 1.6 million citizens a year.  That is 180 deaths each hour from air pollution alone.  That number was more than double the estimated 650,000 deaths attributed to air pollution by the WHO in 2007. The researchers estimate that 38 percent of Chinese residents were regularly exposed to air that was unhealthy to breathe.
  • China's own Minister of Health claimed in 2013 that 350,000 to 500,000 deaths a year could be attributed to air pollution.  As a side note, when I lived in China years ago a Chinese co-worker once told me that as a rule of thumb, Chinese people assume that bad news from the government is always about four times worse than announced.
  • A Rand Corporation paper in 2012 concluded that China's air pollution costs roughly 6.5% of GDP in health costs ($535 billion in that year).  Spending to fix air pollution will have the effect of rolling back some of those expenses.
  • In 2013 a number of pollution problems, commonly reffered to throughout the year as "airpocolypse", led to social dissent and eventually the 2014 "War on Pollution".  By 2014 the dissatisfaction with China's environmental problems pushed pollution to the top of the reasons for civil unrest, with 30,000 to 50,000 "mass incidents" of protest every year.
  • In 2014 He Dongxian, an associate professor at China Agricultural University's College of Water Resources and Civil Engineering, reported that if China's smog problem persisted China's agriculture would suffer conditions very similar to nuclear winter as pollutants severely impede photosynthesis.

Key points on China's ambitious renewable energy investments:

  • China invested $89 billion in renewables in 2014, a 31% rise from the year before.
  • The most ambitious renewable push comes from solar energy.  The solar installation target of 17.8 GW for 2015 is 70% higher than 2014, requiring $29 billion in investment.
  • China's NDRC is aiming for 200 GW of wind capacity by 2020 from a total cumulative capacity of 115 GW capacity at the end of 2014, an average increase of 15% per year for the next 5 years.
  • Renewable expansion will require more transmission and grid improvements.  Electrical grid investment is expected to rise 24% this year to $68 billion. 
  • Hydro power remains China's main go-to renewable, accounting for 8% of total energy at 230 GW.  Hydro power is expected to increase to 350 GW by 2020, over 10% a year on average. Environmental concerns and displacement difficulties may lower the potential growth rate of hydro.
  • Nuclear expansion slowed after Japan's Fukushima accident (as with many other countries), and Beijing is targeting 58 GW of capacity by 2020.

Solar Power:

Top Solar Markets 2015 as % to Total

China has increasingly ambitious plans for solar expansion.  In 2015, Beijing is targeting 17.8 GW of solar installations, 70% more than the 10.5 GW of installations in 2014.  Here are some solar power developments:

  • 5.04 GW of installations have already been completed in Q1 2015.  This brings China's total cumulative installations to 33.12 GW.  Already this year solar capacity has increased 18% in one quarter.
  • 2015 solar targets are expected to require a total investment of over $26 billion.
  • If built as a utility-scale plant, 17.8 GW of solar capacity would cover over 70 square miles of land.
  • Total global solar investment in 2014 amounted to $149.6 billion, and forecasted growth for 2015 is expected to be 30% higher than last year, according to IHS.
  • China is the largest market for solar in the world (see chart on the right).

Wind Power:

  • China has the world's largest wind energy capacity installed, roughly 115 GW according to the China Wind Energy Association.  But, according to official statistics only 96 GW is connected to the grid.  
  • China has the largest wind energy capacity, but the US is the largest generator of wind power.
  • NDRC is aiming for 200 GW of wind capacity by 2020, an average increase of 15% per year.

 

 

 

The CNY's crazy week.

China's currency moves this week rattled markets and raised worries of both a currency war and the exporting of deflation to the rest of the world.  Many argued that the moves by the PBOC were done in desperation to prop up flagging growth.  But, the implications going forward are much more benign.  The devalue came on the heels of bad export numbers, and was probably done to relieve some pressure for exporters hurting from Beijing's linking of the CNY to the strong dollar.  The engineered part of the devaluation is probably over, but there continues to be downward pressure on the CNY.

Downward pressures on the yuan are mainly market and economy driven.  A strong CNY is politically driven.  These two opposing forces are in flux.  

By many measures the yuan is subject to downward pressure in the market due to slowing economic growth, central bank easing as the Fed is preparing to hike, and the currency is arguably the most overvalued major currency in the world (see chart below).  

Real Effective Exchange Rates Percent Change Over 5 Years

Source: BIS

A strong CNY is an important policy tool for China to: Force structural rebalancing within the economy, maintain control over inflation, reverse financial repression, maintain prudent monetary policy, and boost China's international reserve currency plans.  China wants the IMF to include the CNY in its Special Drawing Rights (SDR) when it undertakes a once every five-year vote in a few months.  The inclusion will help elevate the CNY to reserve currency status eventually.  The push to make the CNY a major reserve currency is primarily a political decision by Beijing that has come at the expense of weaker economic prospects in the short-term.

The PBOC maintains significant control over the CNY for policy purposes.  The currency is still only allowed to rise or sink 2% from the midpoint fixing.  The significant control over the banking system allows Beijing to force banks to make trades in the direction mandated by the PBOC.  Beijing has roughly $3.7 trillion in reserves to prop up the currency, and control over the printing of money in order to push down the currency.  China can direct the CNY as it sees fit.  Although the changes to the midpoint fixing mechanism will make controlling the currency more volatile going forward.

What happened this week:

August 10th saw the release of some of the worst trade data out of China in years.  The declining exports were hurt by the CNY appreciation against most major trading partners as it remained stable against the strong USD for political reasons.  The CNY rallied 17% vs. the EUR, 18% vs. the JPY, and 11% vs. the KRW for the year leading up to the devalue.

August 11th, the PBOC moved the CNY 1.9% lower vs. the USD.  The devalue was accompanied by a methodology change for setting the daily fixing midpoint, allowing market forces to play more of a roll.  That allowed China to shrewdly devalue and keep its CNY in the running for the IMF SDRs. The methodology change was welcomed by the IMF.  By giving up some control in setting the midpoint, the PBOC will need to intervene more frequently in order to maintain its policy plans for the CNY.  This will result in more volatility than seen in the past. 

August 12th, the CNY midpoint was lowered again, and the currency fell to the lower end of the allowable range.  The PBOC had to intervene in order to push the CNY higher, and the CNY closed 1% lower.  On the week the CNY is down roughly 2.9% vs. the USD.

The market greeted the events with worry that Beijing was on the cusp of a major devaluation of the CNY in order to bail out economic growth.  This in turn led to worries of igniting a currency war and the exporting of deflation.  The PBOC made a statement that it was targeting a "stable and strong yuan."   The CNY was unchanged for the rest of the week.

Where does the CNY go from here?  China has no need to abandon its domestic and international policy agenda by dramatically driving down the yuan.  The economy is weak but stable.  Xi and Li and Zhou are not afraid of various messy market interventions along the way, but seem to be committed to instituting their policy agendas in the end.  If Hu and Wen were still in charge, the CNY would be 20% lower and the PBOC would be printing money like mad to kick the economy back into high gear.  

But, a slow drift down is not out of the question.  The engineered part of the devalue may be over, but pressures on a lower CNY continue to mount.  Given the market fundamentals and the changes to the CNY midpoint mechanisms blessed by the IMF, the possibility of a lower CNY has increased.  A slow depreciation vs. the USD would not derail domestic reforms.  China's currency has already rallied significantly against its other trading partners, and a modest rollback of that rally (as opposed to a major abrupt devaluation) would not be a setback to restructuring.  

 

The CNY fixing drops and the PBOC releases loan data

The PBOC had a busy Tuesday, adjusting the currency and announcing modestly improved lending numbers.

PBOC throws a bone to exporters

China's yuan fixing was dropped 1.9% overnight by the PBOC, throwing a bone to exporters under siege by competitors with devalued currency advantages this year (see my posting China Trade Numbers Decline As Beijing Maintains Strong CNY, And Commodity Prices Decline.).  All in all, a 2% devalue is pretty modest in comparison to the double digit rise in the CNY against most major currencies.  

It is important to note that the devalue was part of an overall methodology change intended to make the mechanism for setting the fixing rate more market friendly.  The changes and devalue for that reason were very shrewd: The lower currency helps exporters and stimulates growth, and the market mechanism changes keep the IMF from getting spooked.  The IMF has explicitly welcomed the market-oriented changes Beijing has made Tuesday to the mechanisms used to set the fixing.  Beijing sees getting into the SDR as an important step towards becoming a major reserve currency.  

Expect more market interventions in the future as the new market-oriented mechanisms force the PBOC to relinquish some control and subsequently intervene to stabilize the FX.

China's strong currency has been a meaningful headwind to exporters, as seen in the sizable trade number declines in July.  Most trading partner currencies have tanked vs. the yuan, leaving China's export sector at a significant disadvantage and driving down inflation.  The CNY this year had appreciated 17% on the Euro, 18% vs. the Japanese yen, and 11% vs. the Korean won up to Monday this week before the lower fixing.

Why the PBOC acted:

  • Beijing's plans to keep the CNY stable against the US dollar has subjected the yuan to dollar strength at the expense of the export sector.
  • Importing inflation is not a problem, as CPI is running at half of the target this year.
  • Given money supply is well above the target of 12%, loan growth is up, and fiscal stimulus is already in the pipeline, a currency adjustment is a stimulative policy option not yet employed this year.

China credit was subject to stock market activity and the continued reduction of shadow banking.

China's July lending and credit numbers rose in July, with total outstanding loans up well above 15% and money supply surging above the 12% target at 13.3% from July of last year.  The data and PBOC comments point to two factors at play: The dramatic stock market activity, and the continued reduction of shadow banking activity.

First, China's credit numbers were heavily influenced by activity in the stock markets and PBOC interventions in July.  Outstanding bank loan growth accelerated, but total financing slowed measurably as margin reduction activity reduced overall debt and credit growth.  Overall credit numbers are no boon to short-term activity.  The PBOC in a statement said "In order to stabilise market expectations, guard against financial risks, and support healthy capital market development, monetary policy and the banking system in July took a series of temporary measures. Such measures also influence the growth of money supply and loans."  

Second, China's non-traditional credit continues to decelerate.  Trust loan growth is still fading.  Entrusted loans continue to weaken.  Beijing's efforts to reduce the opaque local debt and shadow banking activities are moving forward.

All in all, the weaker currency should help exports and manufacturing, but given the minimal amount of devaluation, only modestly.  The lending numbers were distorted this month by stock market activities, but the weak overall credit growth will not be helpful to boost short-term growth.

 

 

 

China trade numbers decline as Beijing maintains strong CNY, and commodity prices decline.

China's headline trade numbers declined significantly in July.  Exports dropped 8.3% from last year, with imports down 8.1%.  The numbers hint at continued weak demand, but within the details there are two main factors contributing to the declines.

Chinese Yuan 1 Year % Change Vs. Large Trading Partners

First, China's exporters are paying the price for Beijing's efforts to make the CNY a reserve currency.  China has held the CNY steady vs. the USD for the purpose of convincing the IMF to include the yuan in its Special Drawing Rights when it votes this Fall.  SDR inclusion is seen by Beijing as an important step for pushing the yuan into major reserve currency status.  The CNY has in turn inherited the US dollar strength, giving a significant competitive trade advantage to China's major trading partners (see the chart on the right) at the expense of Chinese exports.  Because of the CNY strength, expect exports to show further weakness for months to come.  This will act as a headwind to manufacturers; an opposing force to Beijing's fiscal and monetary stimulus.

Second, the dramatic drop in commodity prices has contributed the bulk of the declining headline import number.  Some of China's largest commodity imports have seen dramatic price drops this year.  Iron ore prices are down 42% from last year. Oil prices are down over 50%.  After adjusting for commodity prices, imports show weak demand, but a more mixed picture.  By volume, the overall demand picture for many commodities in July was positive.  The import weakness has come more from manufactured goods than commodity demand.  A very simple commodity price adjustment shows imports by volume increased around 7.4% on the year (see chart on the right).  As with exports, import numbers will be weak for some time as commodity price declines lower the overall volume numbers, and currency competitiveness helps trade partners.

Some useful details in the trade numbers:

  • Crude oil imports were up 29% from last year as strategic reserves are filled, and stockpiling on price declines takes place.
  • Other commodities also fared well, based on import volume: Iron ore up 4% from last year, palm oil up 36%, copper ore up 7%, soybeans up 27%, and unwrought copper finally showing a gain up 1% after declining all year.
  • Automobile imports saw the biggest drop in import demand, down 27% from last year, replacing coal as China's weakest import.
  • Consumer goods and electronic exports saw the largest declines among export categories.
  • Exports for processing and re-export were down 9.5%, indicating weaker supply chain activity.
  • Imports from South Africa, New Zealand, Germany, and Japan saw the largest declines, as currency appreciation and weaker commodity prices weighed on imports.





Don't mistake China's uneven slowdown for a hard landing.

Growth in China's secondary sector, its biggest driver of the economy's boom over the last two decades, is falling like a bag of hammers.  China's service sector, now the largest portion of its economy, is growing strong.  The rapidly declining growth in the secondary sector - the making and building of tangible things - has caused many China watchers to argue that the hard landing has arrived, and Beijing is hiding the true growth rate.  The truth is much simpler:  China's policy directed slowdown is highly uneven due to parallel efforts to rebalance the economy away from industry and investment.  Therefore, measuring China's overall output by counting rail cars and electricity usage has become insufficient for getting a picture of the entire economy. 

The transition to a more balanced economy that everyone has been advocating and policymakers were avoiding for years is taking place in China. The change is not moving in a straight line or as smooth as many would like it to go, but the transition is happening according to 2015 data.  As a result, the targeted slowdown to a lower growth rate is highly uneven.  The making and building of tangible things - the secondary sector - is slowing much faster than the overall economy.  Services and consumption, on the other hand, continue to show strong growth, both nominally running around double-digit growth rates.  Within China's 7% real GDP growth number, secondary growth has fallen significantly to 5.8%.  Services are growing at a robust 8.9% (see the chart on the right).

More evidence of an uneven slowdown can be seen in the recent PMIs.  The services PMI rose to 53.9, one of the highest numbers of the year.  Manufacturing PMI modestly declined to 50 from an already weak number.  

Category as a % of China's Total Imports

The uneven nature of China's slowdown presents a problem for the rest of the world's economies and exporters.  China import demand is dominated by commodities and industrial machinery (see chart below).  China is already the factory floor for the world's consumer goods, and consumer goods import demand is very limited for now (see my trade maps for more info).  So, more consumption in the short-term and a strong service sector have far fewer beneficiaries outside of China relative to the pain felt from the falling industrial and construction sectors that make up secondary growth.  For the majority of countries and firms dependent on China's once insatiable demand for commodities and machinery, growth has fallen effectively to 5.8% already.  That is a very low growth rate considering much of the world's structural export capacity was built over the last decade to accommodate secondary growth in the double-digits.  The latest results on import demand can be seen here:  http://laohueconomics.com/trade/ 

 

Service growth

The service sector's importance to China's economy is moving higher.  So far this year services represent 49.5% of GDP.  That is up almost a full percent from last year, but still a low number relative to peers.  Services constitute more than 60% of GDP in South Korea, Brazil, Turkey, Poland, and a number of other developing countries.  In Singapore, the number is above 70%.  So, the rebalancing has a long way to go, but the pace has accelerated.  As a result, many light industries with linkages to services are doing quite well (see charts on the right).

China's primary economic goal is to maintain employment stability.  The numbers indicate that China can withstand a slowdown in its traditional engines of growth, industry and investment, as long as the fast-growing service sector picks up the job creation slack.  

Employment in the service sector rose nearly 10 million jobs per year for the 5 years to 2013 (the latest data).  The creation of 10 million net new jobs is Beijing's target for 2015.  According to the New York Times, around 300 million people now work in services, accounting for 40% of China's workforce.  Job creation in the service sector has been absorbing much of the rural labor migration as the agriculture sector workforce continues to rapidly shrink. 

Job creation and its ability to lift living standards and increase wages is a key variable in the legitimacy of the country's political model.  So, as long as the service sector continues to expand quickly, supporting employment stability, China can withstand a weakening secondary industry for some time.  

The secondary sector and the slowdown

A slowdown in the secondary sector has been in the pipeline for years.  Investment in China's industry and construction sectors have decelerated significantly over the last few years (see the chart on the right).  Heavy industry, mining, and industries with overcapacity (steelmaking for example) have seen the quickest slowdowns. State-owned investment continues to lag private investment.  Much of the slowdown in investment, which in turn lead to slowing output, has been directed by Beijing in the form of years of restrictive monetary conditions and a clampdown on local financing vehicles.  The vacuum caused by an investment slowdown by local governments, China's primary driver of infrastructure investment, has not yet been filled by Beijing.  The slower local investment, whether intentional or not, has the benefits of reducing local debt, reining in overcapacity, and curbing pollution.  All of these changes come at the expense of reduced import demand from a slowing secondary sector.

With Beijing keeping service and consumption growth robust in order to facilitate a rebalance, the secondary sector will be used as the main lever to allow overall growth to moderate.  China could possibly lower its GDP growth target to 6.5% within the next couple of years.  If so, the secondary sector could slow to below 5%.

There are a number of structural reforms China needs to do in order to keep the economy on track in the long-term.  Whether Beijing will be successful at all or most is up for debate.  But, for now the data shows that the long-awaited transition to a more balanced economy is unfolding, and a number of China-dependant firms and countries are feeling the effects.  For many, an uneven soft landing feels like a hard landing.  This trend will continue in the long-term.

The good news is that in the short-term, H2 2015 growth will benefit from a cyclical pickup as housing improves and fiscal stimulus finally gets deployed (see my posting Quick Update: Anticipated Fiscal Boost On Its Way? for details).  The bad news is that secondary industry will probably never see growth above 6% after this year, even as GDP goes through a stable slowdown.

经济硬着陆     
中国硬着陆     
软着陆 

 

Quick Update: Fiscal Boost Finally on the Way?

China announced a target budget deficit of 2.3% of GDP early in 2015, a fiscal expansion compared to the 1.8% budget deficit last year.  The fiscal expansion has yet to materialize.  As of June this year, fiscal revenues have exceeded expenditures by more than 200 billion RMB.  And, at the halfway point of the year China has to spend more than double the money to reach the 2015 fiscal expenditure total.  Those numbers mean that China's much-anticipated fiscal stimulus is either on its way in the second half of 2015, or Beijing has decided to be more frugal than advertised this year.

Just how much potential fiscal stimulus?  To meet the budget deficit target of 2.3%, China needs to spend 1.8 trillion RMB in excess of revenues in the second half of this year.  Beijing also needs to deploy over 9 trillion RMB in the second half to reach its total expenditure targets.  These sums are meaningful, and if deployed would finally add the fiscal boost we have been waiting to see all year.  

Overnight, two of China's main policy banks announced that they will issue 1.5 trillion RMB in bonds to fund infrastructure spending.  The spending will flow to the usual sectors: shantytown renewal, railways, urban transportation.  If the spending materializes this year, it will be additive to industry and construction growth.

Added to a housing market cyclical recovery (see my posting China's Property Market Continues To Improve. for details), the numbers should help boost growth prospects in the short-term.  It is important to note that last year's budget deficit fell short of targets, resulting in a lower fiscal boost than many expected.  If Beijing deploys capital in the amount planned, the second half of this year will look better.  Whether a boost can be sustained is up for debate.

 

 

Quick Data Update: Manufacturing PMI still weak, but services PMI improving.

China's PMI data showed a continuation of the trend we have seen all year: Factory output is sluggish, service growth is strong.  On balance, the PMI numbers point to an economy that is stable but still weak.  Economic indictors in June showed that while we are seeing broad improvements, some large domestic industries such as steel, cement, mining, and automobile production remain weak.  The PMIs hint at continued weakness into July. External demand has also been challenged by the dramatic appreciation of the yuan versus key trading partners.  

Services and consumption continue to outpace factory output.

The official manufacturing PMI registered at 50, right on top of the threshold between contraction and expansion.  The components also pointed to continuing weakness.  

The service PMI continues to improve, rising to 53.9, one of the highest readings of the year.

Things to note in the details:

  • Historically, the PMI number falls from June to July.  The average decline for the last ten years has been -0.70.  
  • Both service and manufacturing PMIs reported weaker new orders.  New orders for the manufacturing PMI fell below the 50 mark to 49.9.  The service PMI new orders number also declined, running modestly above the contraction threshold at 50.1.
  • Large enterprises fared much better than small firms, with PMIs coming in at 50.6 and 46.9 respectively.
  • Beijing's primary goal of maintaining stable employment remains at risk.  The employment PMI number, which has been under 50 every month since May 2012, remains weak at 48.  The number was as low as 47.8 early in the year.

For updated PMI charts click here: 


Structural Growth Headwind: Water Problems

Last month NASA's GRACE satellite data showed that the majority of the world's largest groundwater basins - major sources of the planet's drinking water - were being rapidly depleted and on the verge of disappearing.  The North China Plains aquifer, which provides water for 11% of China's population and 14% of its arable land, was one of the critical basins cited.  The NASA revelations are a reminder that China has serious problems with its water resources.  

China's pollution is well documented and highly publicized.  Air pollution often seems to be the focus of most reports concerning China's environmental degradation, but water problems pose just as much, if not more of a threat to the economy. Air pollution foments unrest and leads to severe health problems in the long-term, but water problems require much more immediate attention.  Air is polluted, but plentiful.  Water resources in China are polluted, but very scarce, and literally drying up.  China has a natural water shortage issue due to geographic reasons.  But, pollution and desertification are drastically exacerbating China's water troubles.  

Water pollution, water shortages, and desertification all have both human costs and economic consequences.  Water conservation projects, pollution cleanup, mandatory firm closures, the battle to fight desertification, desalinization projects, health costs, the loss of agricultural productivity, industrial water shortages, and grand projects to move massive amounts of water around the country are all very costly. Beijing needs to throw hundreds of billions of dollars at the problems, diverting resources that could build productivity improving value-added investments.  Unlike roads, tunnels, rails, communications, or smart-grid construction projects, once water projects are completed, most of the contribution to economic output disappears.

Roughly 60-70% of China's water resources are used in agriculture, and another 17% just for the coal and power industries.  Those industries are concentrated in the north, where water is already scarce.

China has renewable internal freshwater resources of 2,070 cubic meters per capita, above the 1,000 cubic meters considered the threshold for "absolute scarcity" by the UN, but roughly a quarter of the global average.  However, the overall number masks a big problem: Four-fifths of China's fresh water lies in its south, and much of the heavily populated economically important north lies well below the UN scarcity threshold.

CHINA WATER RESOURCES PER CAPITA (CUBIC METERS ANNUALLY)          
SOURCE: NATIONAL BUREAU OF STATISTICS OF CHINA 2013 YEAR END

A solution to China's north vs. south water disparity problem has perplexed China for years.  Chairman Mao once stated, "Southern water is plentiful, northern water is scarce.  If at all possible, borrowing some water would be good."  But it was not until recently that Beijing had the know-how and financial resources to tackle the problem.

At the end of 2014, one of the largest public works in history went online with little fanfare.  Construction on the project, called the "North-South Water Diversion Project", began in 2002 with final costs of roughly $60 billion, with some outside estimates of almost $80 billion. The project is designed to divert 45 billion cubic meters of water annually from the south to the north through a series of 1,500 miles of canals and tunnels.  The number amounts to roughly 4% of China's total water consumption.  The project is only one of many expensive measures taken to deal with China's water troubles.  

For investors, taking advantage of China's water investment is more difficult than the country's renewable energy investments.  Water investment is more about know-how and less about components and economies of scale.  Firms with water project know-how, a number of them from Singapore (called the "silicon valley of water" by famed investor Jim Rodgers) are benefitting.  Public-private partnerships to deal with water issues are being aggressively pushed.  The firm I work for restricts me from giving investment advice on this blog, so I will not elaborate.

Here are some interesting facts about China's water troubles:

Pollution

  • According to the council on foreign relations, in 2013 the environment replaced land expropriation as the leading cause of social unrest in China.
  • According to state media reports last year, nearly 60% of China's groundwater is polluted.  
  • A Ministry of Land Resources survey from 2013 reported that 70% of groundwater in the North China Plain, an area that is made up of some of the country's most densely populated and economically vibrant areas (including Beijing and Shandong) is unfit for human touch.  Only 22% of that water is safe for drinking.
  • According to a state media report from 2012, up to 40% of China's rivers were "seriously polluted", with 20% too polluted for human contact.
  • In 2013, the Ministry of Supervision reported almost 1,700 water pollution accidents annually.
  • The Diplomat reported last year that about 70% of water pollution comes from agriculture (runoff from pesticides, fertilizer, and animal waste).  
  • In 2014, authorities announced that 3.3 million hectares of farmland, equivalent to the country of Belgium, is to contaminated for farming.
  • 5 billion tons of soil is lost every year in China according to the WWF, the nutrient equivalent to 40 million tons of fertilizer.  Chinese farmers in turn need to increase the amount of chemical fertilizer each year to make up for the loss of nutrients, adding to pollution troubles.
  • Last year a river in the Zhejiang province caught fire after a lit cigarette was tossed in, leading to 16-foot flames before the fire was put out by the fire department. This year, a lake in Anhui China, where I once lived, turned the color of soy sauce from a wastewater released upstream.  The water killed hundreds of thousands of fish.  
  • Antibiotic resistance is a problem in China, which consumes half of the world's antibiotics with 22% of the world's population.  China sees one million deaths a year from antibiotic-resistant infections.  China's bodies of water are flooded with antibiotics each year.  The Guangzhou Institute of Biochemistry reports that in 2013 92,700 tons of 36 commonly detected antibiotics were consumed in China, 53,800 tons of which ended up in China's rivers after leaving the animals and humans that consumed them. A study in April by Fudan University found that Chinese children are frequently exposed to antibiotics from food and the environment.  

Shortages

  • Beijing's annual per capita water availability is only a couple hundred cubic meters, about a fifth of the UN definition line for "absolute scarcity".
  • China's water resources are down 13% since 2000.
  • A widely publicized census of rivers in 2011 found that China had lost 28,000 rivers in roughly a few decades.  Some of the loss was explained away as bad information collection in past census, but the number is still quite staggering.
  • According to the WWF, desertification has already swept over 30% of China's land.  Every year desertification, caused by overfarming, failing to rotate crops, pollution, climate change, and water scarcity, takes 2,460 square km of land.  Vast tracks of land in China have given way to desertification, affecting 400 million people over the last few decades.  China feeds 22% of the world's population on 7% of the world's tillable land.  The loss of land from desertification was significant consequences for China's food security
  • In 2011 a senior official warned that China's progress tackling desertification was insufficient, calculating that it would take 300 years to reclaim land already lost with its current efforts.

Projects

  • China is ramping up water projects.  This year 57 new water projects are under construction throughout the county.
  • In 2014 nearly $80 billion was invested in water conservation projects, and this year spending is expected to increase.
  • Last year, roughly $330 billion was pledged to take on water pollution over the next five years.
  • In the spring, China's State Council announced an official roadmap for tackling water pollution, dubbed "10 measures for water". The plan aims to get 70% of China's 7 major rivers in "good condition" by 2020 (grade 3 on a 5 point scale; good enough for drinking).  The roadmap also contains plans to improve drinking water, and reduce severely polluted ground water from 15.7% to 15% by 2020.
  • The latest plan also mandates shutdowns for small-scale polluting enterprises.  Smaller firms are easier for Beijing to shutter.
  • To tackle the water shortage, Beijing is building a desalinization plant to go online in 2019 that will provide one-third of Beijing's drinking water.  Desalinization is a highly energy intensive process that will lead to further air pollution and divert resources from economic endeavors.
  • The Ministry of Environmental Protection optimistically calculates that the plans announced this year to deal with China's water problems will over time add $900 billion to GDP through investment and related services.

Stock market update: Beijing vs. Irrational investors. No one seems to be winning.

China's stock market volatility has ramped up again.  The Shanghai Composite fell 8.5% on Monday.  Worries of a market panic have resumed.  As I have mentioned in previous blog posts, applying rational valuations to China's share prices is a futile endeavor in the current environment.  The market has been disconnected from the real economy for some time.  Valuations swing wildly.  Firms can halt trading in their own shares if they don't like the direction of price moves.  Beijing has stepped in, but in doing so has potentially caused more uncertainty. 

See my blog postings from the last few months for more details: China's stock market volatility is crazy, and who knows where we go from here., and China's stock market surge by the numbers., and China stock market returns and the real economy. Just how disconnected?  

The market at this point is a tug of war between Beijing policymakers trying to stabilize markets, and behavior-prone investors driving the market to unreasonable levels of volatility.

China's leadership has a bad track record of controlling markets.  The debt markets, the property markets, and natural resource pricing (water in particular) have proved difficult to control.  Beijing's attempts to control markets have often contributed to inefficiencies and moral hazards. The PBOC and Beijing policymakers, having already entered the business of bailing out shareholders with early July interventions, are now stuck potentially piling resources into the stock market stabilization (see my blog post China stock market interventions are a setback to reforms. for more details).  The battle between China's policymakers and behavior-driven investors will probably end poorly.

On a good note, margin debt has fallen nearly $100 billion since the peak.  June economic data appeared to be unscathed from the market drop.  Valuations do not seem unreasonable currently.  But, volatility does not seem to be going away.

Here is a graphical timeline of stock market events over the last year.

AnnotationChartID2ec83afc7bc7    

Despite stock market volatility, growth prospects look better for the second half of 2015.

There are encouraging signs that overall growth has improved very recently.  Retail sales, manufacturing, trade (see my post Quick Data Update: Trade Data Improves In June. The Improvement Is Much Better Than The Headline Numbers Imply. ), and investment all saw modest improvements in June.  The property market improvement has accelerated.  Housing prices in the top-tier cities are on fire, and sales are growing in the double digits.  Prospects look good for the second half of 2015, but we are coming from a much lower growth rate than the first half headline GDP growth number implies.

It is not all good news however.  Growth in the first half was worse than the headlines suggest owing to a big distortion that may not carry over into the rest of 2015.  And, growth in the industrial sector portion of GDP dipped below 6% already this year (the secondary sector of GDP grew at 5.8% in Q2).  For those worried about commodities and China's making and selling of tangible stuff (and not services), growth is effectively 5.8%, well below the 7% figure overall.  Imports of many key commodities have fallen in the double digits as policy reflation has yet to produce the expected growth boost.

So, expect improvements for the second half of the year, especially in construction and property linked sectors.  However, the poor showing in H1 will increase the risk of Beijing failing to hit the 7% target by the end of the year.

Here are some key factors for growth prospects for the rest of the year:

Growth overall seems to have improved in June.  

A number of indicators improved modestly in June.   The rebounding numbers were not massive, but the upticks were broad.  The data suggests at least a stabilization if not the front end of a cyclical rebound.  Industrial production, retail sales, fixed investment, services & manufacturing PMI, both imports & exports, and housing data all saw an improvement in June.  

April/May looks to be the low point of growth this year so far.  If we see fiscal measures deployed in the second half of the year, PBOC reflation measures spreading into the broad economy, and the property market acceleration all take place, then the rebound will most likely gain momentum.  If the policy reflation effort fizzles, then the rebound may be muted.

Policy reflation expectations.

While certain parts of the economy, property in particular, are showing tangible signs of meaningful improvement, the effects of PBOC easing and a planned government fiscal expansion are much more muted.  Total outstanding credit is still slowing (See chart), and fiscal stimulus has yet to be fully deployed.  Expectations of policy reflation are still mostly based on anticipation and not tangible evidence that reflation is taking place.

As far as the expected fiscal boost goes, fiscal spending usually accelerates in the second half of the year.  Although a budget deficit was targeted this year, China has netted a surplus in the first six months of the year.  If the budget deficit target holds up this year, the second half of the year should see more than 2 trillion RMB in spending unfold.  If spending plans play out for the rest of the year (I think they will), the stimulus will be a much-needed boost to the industrial and the construction sectors.

But, again, reflation expectations for the rest of the year are mostly driven by the anticipation of policy measures boosting growth.  That is a risk to growth prospects.  There is little evidence of stimulus deployment in the numbers so far.  Beijing is still running a fiscal surplus, total outstanding credit is still slowing, and without the extra boost from a transient surge in financial services GDP growth would be well below 7% so far this year.  For more on the risks to policy reflation see my post Reflation Troubles.

The housing market is on the mend.

China's housing market continues to improve.  Prices are rebounding, especially in the larger coastal economies.  Inventory continues to be drawn-down; housing sales are up 18%, and finished construction is down 17%.  There are a number of catalysts for the rebound: price declines, inventory drawdowns, policy easing, favorable mortgage rule changes, and homeowner upgrades.  Given China's demographic changes and existing inventory excesses in the hinterlands, the long-term prospects are murky.  But, for now we are at the front-end of a cyclical housing rebound.  That is good for the industrial and construction sectors.

 For more details see my post China's Property Market Continues To Improve.

GDP growth is lower than 7% if we remove a temporary distortion.

For the first half of the year, the GDP number was distorted on the upside.  The distortion was not due to manipulation by Beijing, but was instead a product of an unsustainable boom in the financial sector, at the very least encouraged by Beijing.  

GDP Growth Rates in H1 2015 by Sector

The financial intermediation portion of the H1 GDP number grew 17.4%, driven by the surging stock markets and record IPOs.  Without the additional one-off boost, growth would have certainly been below 7%, perhaps 6.5% for the year so far.  So, unless financial services can surge another 17%, which is highly unlikely, the second half of the year will need to see a meaningful boost from reflation and the rebounding housing market to make up for it.

See my posting 7% GDP growth? Probably not. for more details.

The secondary sector of GDP growth (industry and construction) is falling like a bag of hammers.  Services continue to fly.  

China's growth in Q2 was dominated by a fast-growing service sector, while the secondary sector (the building, making of tangible things) continues to decelerate.  Even after removing the unsustainable surge in the financial sector, the service sector grew over 8% in Q2, while the secondary sector struggled to a disappointing 5.8%.  The vast overwhelming majority of China's imports are meant for industry. So for those concerned with China's making and building of things, or China's commodity demand, Q2 effectively grew at 5.8%.  We see the results of sluggish H1 industry and construction in China's weak commodity demand this year (See the chart below).

 

Year to Date Commodity Imports (Volume) vs. Last Year to June 2015 (Percent Change)

China's property market continues to improve.

One of the primary drags on China's economic growth this year has been the declining housing market.  The market continues to show signs of a rebound that will eventually add a boost to growth in the short-term.

The rebound has been driven by a few factors:

  • The housing price drop over the last year has come as disposable income averaged an 8.5% increase (rising incomes with lower house prices).  Effective price drops over the last year have been in the double digits, enticing buyers back into the market.  
  • PBOC measures have brought down borrowing rates.  
  • Mortgage restrictions, among other housing market restrictions, were lowered in March as Beijing tried to stimulate the market.  
  • Developers have been able to tap into homeowners' desire to upgrade.

Positive developments pointing to a rebound:

  • Prices are improving (see charts).  
  • Residential property sales are up 16% from last year.  
  • Completed residential construction declined 17% so far this year vs. last.  New housing starts this year are down 16%.  I calculate that this amounts to about 1.5 million fewer housing units on tap to be finished this year compared with last year; 7.5 million units of total supply this year at current trends.
  • Although it is difficult to estimate housing demand, Goldman Sachs estimates equilibrium housing demand - given new household formation, urbanization, and obsolescence - is between 7.5 to 8 million units a year.  At the current pace, demand is probably outstripping supply this year, and a pickup in sales and prices should boost new construction.
  • The drivers of this housing rebound seem to be buyers intent on living in an upgraded house, not investors.  An FT survey from May shows that potential homebuyers are expressing interest for self-occupancy home purchases, but have turned negative on purchasing for investment purposes.  
  • 45% of developers surveyed said that upgrades were the largest source of home sales in recent months.  
  • Investors seem less inclined to enter the market this year.  In May, 14% of those in the FT survey said they intend to invest in property in the next three months.  A property rebound driven by housing occupants and not investors may be more durable.
  • Housing market improvement are taking place primarily in the first and second-tier cities, where housing rebounds will have a greater effect on the overall economy (see the map below).
MONTH ON MONTH PRICE CHANGES FOR 70 CITIES JUNE 2015 (Red = Loss, Blue = Gain)                    
 

The property market is improving, but there are still negatives:

  • Real estate investment is growing at a weak 3.4% on the year.
  • New housing starts are still declining, down 16% on the year.
  • China has a sizable oversupply of unused homes; some estimates put vacancy rates at 22%.  But, it is important to point out many of these empty units are investment properties not intended for occupancy.

Structural and demographic changes may be changing long-term housing market prospects, and easing efforts to support the property market might renew bubble worries.  But in the short-term, the housing market seems to be on the front end of a rebound.  Real estate makes up ( directly and indirectly) about a quarter of China's economic growth.  A real estate rebound is a significant development.